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 Abstract 
This thesis examines the properties of two short-term interest rates: the 
federal funds rate and the rate of return on 90-day Treasury securities (T-Bills). 
Findings indicate strong evidence of cointegration among the two series. This 
result leads us to consider whether future movements in T-bill returns are 
predictable using the same methods used to predict the target federal funds 
rate. The “Taylor Rule,” introduced by Taylor (1993), assumes the Federal 
Reserve considers inflation and the output gap in their deliberation of how to 
adjust the federal funds target rate. We do an in-sample analysis followed by 
an out-of-sample forecasting comparison. Findings show that, in addition to 
inflation and the output gap, the unemployment rate and stock market contain 
valuable information for forecasting future T-bill rates. 
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CHAPTER 1 - Introduction 
he ability to explain and predict the seemingly chaotic behavior of 
short-term government securities affects both primary and secondary 
market participants as well as policy makers. The impact of constantly 
changing security yields on these individuals and institutions are enormous 
and should be assessed closely. Expanding knowledge of how to predict 
changes in interest rates can, and often does, serve as a competitive advantage 
in the money markets. The specific asset of interest in this thesis is the 90-day 
United States Treasury Security (T-bill). 
 The ultimate riskless security is considered to be the U.S. Treasury bill. 
Thus the rate of return on this security is often referred to as the “risk-free 
rate” (Pratt, Reilly and Schweihs p. 161, 2000). T-bills are liquid; there is an 
active secondary market where they may be traded. They are important 
financial instruments to individuals, financial institutions, corporations, 
governments and the Federal Reserve System, all of which hold sizeable 
amounts of U.S. Treasury debt, including T-bills, in their portfolios (Rose p. 
369, 1994). 
 The Taylor Rule is an important concept in the analysis of monetary 
policy decisions. Developed by John Taylor (1993), it seeks to explain how 
macroeconomic variables should help predict the federal funds rate. The rule 
will be heavily cited in the analysis to come because the federal funds rate 
tends to influence most interest rates in the United States. This tendency will 
be further explained in the sections to come. 
In this thesis, independent variables are tested for correlation with 
movements in T-bill rates. Significant variables will then go through an 
additional out-of-sample test. The purpose of out-of-sample testing in this 
thesis is to get a better handle on the predictive power of the explanatory 
variables. 
The most important concept of this thesis is not the estimated regression 
model, but rather an intuitive understanding of what economic forces 
T 
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consistently forecast T-bill rates and how firms and individuals can turn this 
knowledge into a profit generating tool. Our results are also useful to those 
interested in understanding Federal Reserve behavior. 
 
CHAPTER 2 - The Literature 
We have motivated explaining the T-bill rate using macroeconomic 
factors. The literature review portion of this thesis will focus on comparing and 
contrasting the variety of methods proposed to model the target federal funds 
rate. 
One of the first and most influential “critiques” of policy modeling was 
that of Lucas (1976). Lucas’s work explains the downfalls of using technical 
analysis methods for predicting policy actions. Many important lessons were 
learned. First, any econometric finding should be supported by a 
microeconomic theory based upon rational agents. In this thesis, we assume 
the Federal Reserve is a rational agent acting to maximize the welfare of the 
economy in the long-run. Second, the structure of an econometric model varies 
greatly with changes in the structure of the series pertinent to the policy 
maker; from this we can infer that any change in policy will possibly change 
the structure of the econometric model at hand. In most cases, a backward-
looking model is not known to be subject to this critique because of time-frame. 
To illustrate, in this thesis we are actually trying to predict policy changes 
using historical aggregates. In this case the Lucas critique is not relevant (see 
Diebold (1998)). 
The first step in modeling the decisions of any organization or institution 
is to understand their motivation. In the case of most firms, decisions are made 
in order to maximize profit. However, government entities usually operate 
under a framework that encourages the maximization of welfare. The following 
passage was retrieved from section 2a of the Federal Reserve Act. The passage 
concerning the explicit monetary policy objectives of the Federal Reserve reads 
as follows: 
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 The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the Federal 
Open Market Committee shall maintain long run growth of the monetary 
and credit aggregates commensurate with the economy's long run potential 
to increase production, so as to promote effectively the goals of maximum 
employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates. 
 
Frederic Mishkin (Federal Reserve Governer, 2006-2008) proposes the 
following seven guidelines as a model for central bank effectiveness. (Mishkin 
p. 37, 2007)  
 
 Price stability provides substantial benefits; 
 Fiscal policy should be aligned with monetary policy; 
 Time inconsistency is a serious problem to be avoided; 
 Monetary policy should be forward-looking; 
 Accountability is a basic principle of democracy; 
 Monetary policy should be concerned about output as well as price 
fluctuations; and 
 The most serious economic downturns are associated with 
financial instability 
 
 The aforementioned guidelines are not set forth by any sort of legislation, 
but are instead the opinion of many monetary economists. Furthermore, they 
are a subjective outline of what a central bank considers while crafting a 
monetary policy strategy. Given its subjectivity, economists are met with many 
challenges in forecasting monetary decisions of the Federal Reserve. 
As one can visualize, many difficulties arise in crafting a monetary 
strategy that satisfies the aforementioned goals. However, most of the popular 
literature indicates that the stable growth of a nation relies upon stabilizing 
inflation and output fluctuations. e.g. Taylor (1993) and Clarida, Gali, and 
Gertler (2000).  
Setting a Target 
Numerous attempts at modeling the tactical moves of the Federal Reserve 
have been made. Some papers estimate a reaction function that predicts the 
federal funds target rate. Khoury (1990) uses a number of empirical surveys to 
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arrive at a reaction function. Bernanke and Blinder (1992), along with others, 
have used vector autoregressions to estimate prediction models as well. 
Although the aforementioned papers have found a great deal of success, Taylor 
(1993) proposed a more straightforward theoretical approach to predicting 
Federal Reserve decisions. Most literature on the issue, including Rudd and 
Rudebusch (1998), find the Taylor rule theoretically sound (especially during 
Greenspan’s tenure) and offer a good amount of empirical evidence. The Taylor 
rule relates the federal funds rate target to inflation and the GDP according to 
 
𝑖𝑡 =  𝜋𝑡 + 𝑎𝜋 𝜋𝑡 − 𝜋𝑡
∗ + 𝑎𝑦  𝑦𝑡 + 2, (1) 
 
where, 𝑖 = federal funds rate, 𝜋𝑡  = Inflation, 𝜋𝑡
∗ = target inflation rate (Taylor 
calls for 2 percent), 𝑦𝑡 = Output gap (100(real GDP - potential GDP) / potential 
GDP) 
 
Based on Taylor’s original specifications, 𝑎𝜋  and 𝑎𝑦  are set equal to .5. In 
the case of inflation being 50 basis points above target, the Federal Reserve 
would set the federal funds rate 25 basis points above the 2 percent steady-
state equilibrium federal funds target, ceteris paribus. The 2 percent steady-
state equilibrium rate was simply a rounded figure derived from the actual 2.2 
percent average discovered by Taylor (1993) using the sample 1984:1-1992:3. 
Also, Taylor assumed 𝜋∗  is equal to 2 percent, simply because if both the 
inflation rate and real GDP are on target, then the federal funds rate would be 
4 percent, or 2 percent in real terms. Another implication to consider is that 
Taylor suggested the Federal Reserve would only raise or lower the federal 
funds rate if inflation and/or the output gap were off target by at least 1 
percent. 
Similar to most macroeconomic models which seek to predict an 
economic variable, the accuracy of the Taylor model is difficult to test because 
it includes independent variables that are difficult to quantify.  
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Bernanke (2010) reveals how the Federal Reserve interprets the 
usefulness of the Taylor rule. “Simple rules necessarily leave out many factors 
that may be relevant to the making of effective policy in a given episode, such 
as the risk of the policy rate hitting the zero lower bound, which is why we do 
not make monetary policy on the basis of such rules alone.” Taking this type of 
approach to setting the target rate gives the FOMC the option to use 
discretionary policy. This might be accommodated by adding a random error 
term to the Taylor model. 
Clarida, Gali, Gertler (2000) Approach 
Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000) propose an extension to the Taylor 
model by way of using the same components proposed by Taylor in a forward-
looking manner. Whether the Federal Reserve uses current data or forecasts of 
future data to make its decisions concerning the federal funds rate is still 
debated among economists. Despite the controversy, Clarida, Gali, and Gertler 
(2000) make a convincing argument. In their paper they explain how their 
expectations model collapses to the Taylor model in the event that the Federal 
Reserve is not forward-looking.  
 
𝑖𝑡 =  𝑖
∗ + 𝛽1   𝐸 𝜋𝑡 ,𝑘  𝛿𝑡 − 𝜋
∗ + 𝛽2  𝐸 𝑦𝑡 ,𝑞  𝛿𝑡  (2) 
 
where 𝜋𝑡 ,𝑘  denotes inflation between periods t and (t+k). 𝜋
∗ is target inflation. 
𝑦𝑡 ,𝑞  is a measure of the output gap between periods t and (t+q). 𝛿𝑡 is the 
information set the FOMC has access to when the rate is set. In both cases, E 
is the expectation operator.  
The expectations model is, as you can see, a duplicate of the Taylor rule 
with the exception that it is forward-looking and uses expectations rather than 
historical and current data. The problem in modeling this equation empirically 
lies in the fact that 𝜋𝑡 ,𝑘  and 𝑦𝑡 ,𝑞  must be assessed using an ambiguous 
information set 𝛿𝑡.  
 6 
The expectations model is consistent with the assumption that central 
banks should be forward-looking; whereas the Taylor rule, as introduced in 
Taylor (1993), leaves no room for this notion. However, Barro and Gordon 
(1983) outline one possible downfall to using a forward-looking model. Among 
others, they outline a problem concerning inflationary bias when discretionary 
policy rules are used and there exist the wrong incentives. Strict policy rules 
act to amend such inefficiencies; however they may not allow policy makers to 
act in the face of predictable shocks to inflation or the output gap. If the goal is 
to model Federal Reserve behavior, as opposed to saying what is optimal, we 
need to model what the Federal Reserve actually does. 
A few problems arise in using purely theoretical models to judge the 
decisions of the Federal Reserve. First, there is a problem with the dependent 
variables of these models. In practice, the federal funds rate is a discrete 
variable that is very limited in sudden movement (recall the 1 percent threshold 
discussed earlier). Both the Taylor Rule and the Expectations Model assume 
the Federal Reserve will behave in a manner that allows them to make extreme 
changes to the interest rate until alignment with equilibrium is accomplished. 
However we know this is not the case because history has taught us that large 
changes are made over time in a smooth manner. As an example, consider the 
recession of 2008. The federal funds target rate was just below 5 percent at the 
beginning of the recession (December 2007); it was almost an entire year later 
(November 2008) that the federal funds target rate was down to 1 percent, later 
followed by the zero bound. 
Other Approaches 
 Although the Taylor Rule and Expectations Model are among the most 
heavily cited models in monetary economics to date, some believe they still 
have problems. Surprisingly enough, most criticism of these models comes at 
the pen of policy makers themselves. King (1996) argues “the overriding 
objective of monetary policy should be price stability.” referring to such 
behavior as “inflation nutting.” Mishkin (p. 74-85, 2007) reveals from his 
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experience working with the Federal Reserve that putting too great an 
emphasis on output fluctuations will produce undesirable results for a couple 
of reasons. First, accurate measures of the output gap are extremely difficult to 
obtain. This causes an overall difficulty in communication among policy 
makers. Second, even if output gap data is easy to obtain, inflation measures 
may already capture excess output (a simulation of this phenomenon will be 
modeled later in this thesis). With regard to these observations, Svensson 
(1997) suggests setting the federal funds rate so that the following rule is 
satisfied. 
𝐸 𝜋𝑡+2 =  𝜋
∗ (3) 
 
The goal would be to target an inflation forecast rather than an interest 
rate. The general premise is to set the rate so future inflation (two quarters 
ahead in this case) is expected to be equal to target inflation. Such a policy rule 
would allow the central bank to care about the output gap in the short run. 
There again, difficulty arises in using a method as implicit as this. However, 
you can see how the approach contrasts with the others. 
Hitting the Target 
The Federal Reserve has only announced an explicit target for the federal 
funds rate since 1995 (“Open Market Operations” 2010). Although in earlier 
years a target was set, there was less effort made to publicize it. According to 
Taylor (2001), messages about federal funds rate target changes were sent 
through specific types of purchases or sales of securities under certain 
circumstances. This method of message transmission led to poor information 
exchange among the Federal Reserve and the nation at large. The method of 
announcing the target rate is more effective at maintaining a small spread 
between the target and effective rate. According to Meulendyke (1998, 142), 
“The rate has tended to move to the new, preferred level as soon as the banks 
know the intended rate.” This intuition will be useful for our analysis to come. 
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CHAPTER 3 - The Experiment 
Interest Rate Behavior 
The T-bill is an interesting security considering its relationship with the 
target (and effective) federal funds rate. These two rates have moved closely for 
years. Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between T-bills and the target 
federal funds rate from roughly 2004 to 2009. Figure 2 shows the T-bill rate 
and the effective federal funds rate. Theoretically, the relationship exists 
because the federal funds rate is controlled via the FOMC in primary markets 
(with dealers who have created relationships with the Federal Reserve), in order 
to attain a desirable federal funds effective rate. Considering the federal funds 
effective rate is the weighted average of all lending between Federal Reserve 
member institutions (banks mostly), we can infer that the Federal Reserve has 
no direct influence over this rate. However, if the Federal Reserve buys and 
sells T-bills in a way such that their prevailing rate of return is just below that 
of the federal funds rate target, the federal funds effective rate will naturally 
prevail slightly above the T-bill rate (as long as there exists a liquidity 
preference), and thus close to the federal funds target rate. Since 1995 (“Open 
Market Operations” 2010) the Federal Reserve has set an explicit target 
however and this process has been almost automatic ever since. Federal funds 
lending now tends to adjust contemporaneously with the explicit target. We 
infer this is due to expectations.  
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Figure 1: Daily Federal Funds Target Rate and 3-Month Treasury Bill Yields 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Effective Federal Funds Rate and 3-Month Treasury Bill Yields 
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Sarno and Thornton (2003) use the Johansen maximum likelihood 
cointegration procedure developed by Johansen (1991) to show strong evidence 
of cointegration among the federal funds rate and T-bill that is surprisingly 
stable over the time period of 1974-1999. Sarno and Thornton (2003) also 
found the federal funds rate tends to adjust more quickly to the equilibrium 
rate than T-bills (possibly an explanation for the non-linear behavior). They 
suggest this could be attributed to factors such as transaction costs and 
infrequent/frequent trading.  
Test for a Unit-Root 
The Augmented Dickey-Fuller technique is employed in this thesis to test 
for evidence of a unit-root process. The method was developed across the 
course of several papers, including Said and Dickey (1984), and is an extension 
of the original Dickey-Fuller test. This procedure begins by choosing an optimal 
lag length. In this thesis we use the lag length that minimizes the value of 
Bayesian Information Criteria (BIC). Once the optimal lag length is chosen, the 
following regression is run: 
∆𝑦𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑦𝑡−1 +  𝛽𝑗
𝑘
𝑗 =1
∆𝑦𝑡−𝑗 + 𝜀𝑡 , 
 
(4) 
where 𝑦 is the observed variable. The null hypothesis of a unit root is 𝐻0: 𝛽1= 0, 
the alternative hypothesis 𝐻0: 𝛽1< 1. A t-test of that hypothesis does not have a 
standard distribution, so we use critical values provided by Stata. 
 It comes as no surprise we cannot reject the null hypothesis of a unit 
root in either case. Most studies find that interest rates are non-stationary 
(e.g., Stock and Watson, 1988, 1999a). 
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Table 1: Augmented Dickey-Fuller Procedure for Variables: Federal Funds Effective Rate 
and 3-Month Treasury Bill Yields. 
 
3-Month T-bill Rate 
 
 
Effective Federal Funds Rate 
 
 
Test for Cointegration - Results for Johansen Test 
Integration of all series tested for cointegration is required. We confirm 
this using the Augmented Dicky-Fuller test (above). Given that both the federal 
funds rate and T-bill rate are non-stationary, the Johansen test for 
cointegration. For this method, the order of integration does not matter (an 
advantage over the Engle-Granger method). Using a slightly more updated 
sample period than that of Sarno and Thornton (2003) (1983:1-2003:4), Table 
2 summarizes a Johansen test for cointegration. We are able to reject the null 
hypothesis of zero cointegrating relations, with a test statistic of 109.9, 
compared with a critical value of 15.4. We cannot reject the null of one 
cointegrating relation against two relations. This is consistent with our 
expectations. There can be at most one relation with two variables. These 
results indicate a maximum of 1 cointegrating relationship between the T-bill 
                                                                              
 Z(t)             -0.480            -3.534            -2.904            -2.587
                                                                              
               Statistic           Value             Value             Value
                  Test         1% Critical       5% Critical      10% Critical
                                          Interpolated Dickey-Fuller          
Dickey-Fuller test for unit root                   Number of obs   =        83
                                                                              
 Z(t)             -0.369            -3.534            -2.904            -2.587
                                                                              
               Statistic           Value             Value             Value
                  Test         1% Critical       5% Critical      10% Critical
                                          Interpolated Dickey-Fuller          
Dickey-Fuller test for unit root                   Number of obs   =        83
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rate and the federal funds rate.1 Results were obtained from testing with an 
unrestricted constant term.  
To illustrate this cointegrating relationship in a more concrete manner, 
consider the T-bill rate (𝐵𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑡) and the federal funds rate (𝐹𝐹𝐸𝑅𝑡 ). In this case, 
we will assume both 𝐵𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑡 and 𝐹𝐹𝐸𝑅𝑡  exibit first order integration. 𝐵𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑡 and 
𝐹𝐹𝐸𝑅𝑡  are cointegrated if there exists a 𝛽1 that satisfies 
 
𝐵𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐹𝐹𝐸𝑅𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 (5) 
   
This equation makes sense for our analysis because we know the T-bill 
rate prevailing in the treasury market should be equal to the federal funds rate 
plus a small constant (most likely negative in the case of T-bills) and an error 
term.  
 
Table 2: Johansen Maximum Likelihood Cointegration Procedure for Variables: Federal 
Funds Effective Rate and 3-Month Treasury Bill Yields.  
 
Cointegration likelihood ratio tests based on trace eigenvalue of the stochastic matrix (trace 
statistic) 
Note: * indicates the trace statistic corresponding to the maximum rank of cointegration. In this case the rank is 1. 
 
Confirming cointegration will become pertinent as our analysis of T-bill 
rates continues. The most important lesson we can learn from this test is that 
the federal funds rate and T-bill rates actually co-move over long periods of 
time.       
                                                 
1
 The cointegration test used monthly data from 1983:1-2003:4. Sarno and Thornton (2003) find similar results 
over a comparable sample period. 
                                                                               
    2      6       -378.8335     0.01042
    1      5      -380.65096     0.26387      3.6349*    3.76
    0      2      -433.80146           .    109.9359    15.41
  rank    parms       LL       eigenvalue  statistic    value
maximum                                      trace    critical
                                                         5%
                                                                               
Sample:  1960m3 - 1989m1                                         Lags =       1
Trend: constant                                         Number of obs =     347
                       Johansen tests for cointegration                        
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Many papers have affirmed this relationship and attributed it to the idea 
that both rates are a product of the expectations hypothesis. e.g. Rudebusch 
(2001) and Woodford (1999). Thus, it is assumed the T-bill rate is similar to the 
market’s expectation for the federal funds rate. 
If the expectations hypothesis holds, or if markets are forward-looking at 
all, the federal funds rate will also have an effect on the latter portions of the 
term structure. According to findings by Cook and Hahn (1988), changes in the 
target rate have been followed by large movements in the same directions in the 
short-term market, moderate movements in intermediate-term rates and small, 
but significant movements in long-term rates. 
The idea of “forward-looking markets” could possibly help us understand 
why the federal funds rate often follows (lags) behind T-bill rates. For example, 
if the market behaves in a way that drives up T-bill rates in expectation of a 
rise in the federal funds rate target, it may seem as though the federal funds 
rate is following the T-bill rate when in fact the opposite is true.2 
Now we can begin to see how the Federal Open Market Committee 
(FOMC) has the ability to influence the interest rates of almost any short-term 
debt instrument in either direction by holding the power to literally anchor the 
short end of the term structure spectrum. Since we also know how closely the 
effective federal funds rate shadows the target rate set by the FOMC (contrast 
figures 1 and 2), we can theoretically model the prediction of T-bill rates by 
predicting decisions made by the FOMC regarding the target rate. 
Modeling the Taylor Rule 
We have already discussed the extent to which the federal funds target 
rate predicts the effective federal funds rate and demonstrated in the previous 
chapter that the effective federal funds rate is cointegrated with the rate of 
return on short-term securities (specifically T-bills). This suggests that the 
                                                 
2
 The federal funds rate tends to anchors the rates of short term government securities because of their similar 
liquidity and availability to banks. i.e. if a bank has excess reserves, they can opt to buy securities, or loan the 
reserves to other banks at the federal funds rate. 
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macroeconomic variables that influence the federal funds rate should also hold 
predictive power for T-bills. We therefore replace the federal funds rate in the 
Taylor rule with the T-bill rate to get an equation that can be used to predict 
the T-bill rate. Formally 
 
𝐵𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑡 ≅  𝑖𝑡 =  𝜋𝑡 + 𝑎𝜋 𝜋𝑡 − 𝜋𝑡
∗ + 𝑎𝑦  𝑦𝑡 + 2 (6) 
in econometric form: 
𝐵𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝜋𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑦𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡  (7) 
 
Results from simple forecasts like these should be interpreted with 
caution however. As Thomas (1999) points out, T-bill yields are often 
influenced by a number of factors aside from inflation and the output gap, 
including cyclical, liquidity, and “safe-haven” considerations. While one could 
in principle add more variables to the model to account for these factors, in 
practice we do not have data that capture such things as the “safe haven” 
hypothesis. If certain factors of the financial environment are behaving wildly, 
the forecasts form our model could be poor. 
 
Figure 3: GDP and Potential GDP 
(Billions of chained 2000 dollars) 
 
Source: Congressional Budget Office.  
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Output Gap and Inflation Dynamics 
In the most heavily cited papers that estimate the Federal Reserve’s 
policy rule, e.g. Taylor (1993) and Clarida, Gali, Gertler (2000), the output gap 
and inflation are the two key macroeconomic variables that influence FOMC 
behavior. This is reasonable, given that Congress has established the Federal 
Reserve’s mandate as the pursuit of low and stable inflation and full 
employment. We now provide the reader with an empirical explanation of how 
these two variables are believed to behave with estimations constructed by 
Rudebusch and Svensson (1998).3  
   
𝑦𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜗1𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝜗2𝑦𝑡−2 − 𝜗3 𝑖𝑡−1
𝑎 − 𝜋𝑡−1
𝑎  + 𝜀𝑡  (8) 
 
𝜋𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝜋𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝜋𝑡−2 + 𝛽3𝜋𝑡−3 +  1 − 𝛽1 − 𝛽2 − 𝛽3 𝜋𝑡−4
+ 𝛽4𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡  
(9) 
 
where 𝑖𝑡−1
𝑎 =
1
4
 𝑖𝑡−𝑗
3
𝑗 =0  and 𝜋𝑡−1
𝑎 =
1
4
 𝜋𝑡−𝑗
3
𝑗 =0 . 𝑖𝑡−1
𝑎  and 𝜋𝑡−1
𝑎  are thought of as 
quarterly averages of the federal funds rate and the output gap respectively.  
 𝑦𝑡 is the output gap as a function of its own lagged values and of the 
differences between the average federal funds rate and inflation over the most 
recent four months. The third term of the equation is a sort of monetary 
transmission mechanism to help describe how policy-induced changes in the 
federal funds rate influence the output gap. As an illustration, consider an 
economy in which the Federal Reserve wishes to reduce the output gap. The 
Federal Reserve would raise the effective federal funds rate. According to the 
above equation, this action will trigger a decrease in the output gap due to the 
sign on 𝜗3 being negative. 
  𝜋𝑡  is Rudebusch’s proposal for quantifying inflation as a function of 
lagged inflation and one lag of the output gap. Rudebusch and Svensson (1998) 
                                                 
3
 Nearly identical models are suggested by Svensson (1997) 
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estimate the above inflation model. They fail to reject the hypothesis that the 
coefficients of the four lags of inflation sum to one.  This model implies an 
accelerationist Phillips curve (vertical in the long-run) on account of the 
reliance on lagged values of inflation itself (an unemployment variable is not 
included). The accelerationist curve assumes inflation is always backward-
looking and there exists a “natural” rate of unemployment that corresponds to 
equilibrium. When unemployment is below its natural rate, inflation will be 
increasing; when it is above it, it will be decreasing 
 We have updated the regressions in Rudebusch and Svensson (1998) 
with data from 1983:1 to 2003:4 to get a feel for how stable the parameters are. 
First, coefficients estimated by Rudebusch and Svensson (1998) over the period 
1961:1 to 1996:2 are reported for both inflation and the output gap (Tables 3 
and 4). Next, we estimate the same models over the period 1983:1 to 2003:4 
(tables 5 and 6). For the inflation model, t-tests show the first 3 lags of inflation 
and the output gap to be significant. However, the fourth lag of inflation is not 
significant. These results differ little from Rudebusch and Svensson (1998). For 
the output gap, t-tests show the first two lags of inflation to be significant. 
However, the monetary transmission mechanism  𝑖𝑡−1
𝑎 − 𝜋𝑡−1
𝑎   is insignificant at 
any conventional confidence level. Rudebusch and Svensson (1998) found this 
variable significant. Considering our dataset is more contemporaneous, it is 
possible that monetary policy has had less effect on the output gap in more 
recent years. 
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Table 3: Rudebusch’s Estimates of Inflation Equation 
  
𝝅𝒕 = 𝜶 + 𝜷𝟏𝝅𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜷𝟐𝝅𝒕−𝟐 + 𝜷𝟑𝝅𝒕−𝟑 + 𝜷𝟒𝝅𝒕−𝟒 + 𝜷𝟒𝒚𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜺𝒕 
Variable Coefficient   Standard Error 
          
𝜋𝑡−1    0.70    0.08 
𝜋𝑡−2    -0.10    0.10 
𝜋𝑡−3    0.28    0.10   
𝜋𝑡−4    0.12    0.08 
𝑦𝑡−1    0.14    0.03 
 
Notes: Observations: 84, Sample period: 1961:1-1996:2, Frequency: Quarterly 
 
Table 4: Author’s Estimates of Rudebusch’s Inflation Equation 
  
𝝅𝒕 = 𝜶 + 𝜷𝟏𝝅𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜷𝟐𝝅𝒕−𝟐 + 𝜷𝟑𝝅𝒕−𝟑 + 𝜷𝟒𝝅𝒕−𝟒 + 𝜷𝟒𝒚𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜺𝒕 
Variable Coefficient   Standard Error 
          
𝜋𝑡−1    0.50    0.10 
𝜋𝑡−2    -0.21    0.10  
𝜋𝑡−3    0.32    0.10 
𝜋𝑡−4    0.12    0.10 
𝑦𝑡−1    0.14    0.01 
 
Notes: Observations: 84, Sample period: 1983:1-2003:4, Frequency: Quarterly 
 
Table 5: Rudebusch’s Estimates of Output Equation 
  
𝒚𝒕 = 𝜶 + 𝝑𝟏𝒚𝒕−𝟏 + 𝝑𝟐𝒚𝒕−𝟐 − 𝝑𝟑 𝒊𝒕−𝟏
𝒂 − 𝝅𝒕−𝟏
𝒂  + 𝜺𝒕 
Variable Coefficient   Standard Error 
          
𝑦𝑡−1    1.16    0.08 
𝑦𝑡−2    -0.25    0.08 
 𝑖𝑡−1
𝑎 − 𝜋𝑡−1
𝑎     -0.10    0.03 
 
 
Notes: Observations: 84, Sample period: 1961:1-1996:2, Frequency: Quarterly 
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Table 6: Author’s Estimates of Rudebusch’s Output Equation 
  
𝒚𝒕 = 𝜶 + 𝝑𝟏𝒚𝒕−𝟏 + 𝝑𝟐𝒚𝒕−𝟐 − 𝝑𝟑 𝒊𝒕−𝟏
𝒂 − 𝝅𝒕−𝟏
𝒂  + 𝜺𝒕 
Variable Coefficient   Standard Error 
          
𝑦𝑡−1    1.17    0.10 
𝑦𝑡−2    -0.29    0.10 
 𝑖𝑡−1
𝑎 − 𝜋𝑡−1
𝑎     0.03    0.02 
 
 
Notes: Observations: 84, Sample period: 1983:1-2003:4, Frequency: Quarterly 
 
Dynamics of Leading Indicators 
Finding useful leading indicators of changes in interest rates (T-bill 
returns) is not an easy task and the literature does not provide clear guidance 
about the selection of leading indicators. Wesley Mitchell and Arthur Burns are 
believed to be the first advocates of the idea that historical aggregates will yield 
predictive power for the macroeconomy. Mitchell and Burns (1938) employ 71 
quarterly series to form a composite leading indicator. Indicators such as these 
have met with criticisms such as the “measurement without theory” notion, 
originally crafted by Koopmans (1947). Box and Jenkins (1976) have since shed 
many of these criticisms after the proposal of time-series based evaluation of 
leading indicators. Despite decades of discussion and arguments among 
authors, composite indicators such as these are still widely cited and used by 
economist in making cyclical trend predictions. Kaminsky, Lizondo and 
Reinhart (1998) conclude that certain economic indicators are useful predictors 
of currency crises. Stock and Watson (2002) provide a good theoretical analysis 
of how principle component analysis is useful for forecasting and leading 
indicator purposes. 
In this thesis, our first assumption is that leading indices are useful for 
predicting changes (turning points) of T-bill returns, rather than predicting 
explicit values. This notion of using leading indicators in a less theoretical 
manner is affirmed by Diebold and Rudebusch (1989) in their analysis of 
business cycles using Bayesian sequential probability forecasting. This thesis 
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uses regression methods, thus it is pertinent to mention similar studies by 
Estrella and Mishkin (1998) and Staiger, Stock and Watson (1997). Standards 
for qualifying potential leading indicators in this thesis follow a structural 
method outlined in the methodology section to follow. 
Methodology 
The empirical work that follows uses a systematic method of eliminating 
insignificant variables from a pool of candidates. According to Estrella and 
Mishkin (1998), the more variables a model includes, the better the in-sample 
results. However, liberal inclusion of explanatory variables in the regression 
will not necessarily help -and frequently hurts- results when extrapolating 
beyond the sample’s end. A model that has been overfit will yield little 
predictive power in out-of-sample testing. The empirical results of this thesis 
provide information about how advantageous a simple “Taylor-like” model can 
be when complemented with a limited number of significant variables. 
The general purpose of this thesis is to examine simple financial 
variables that help predict T-bill returns. Thus, in addition to the variables 
entering the Taylor rule, other readily available and meaningful variables are 
presented in Table 7. Table 7 also contains the expected information lag in 
attaining data for the variables. To illustrate, managers will have no use for a 
predictive variable that makes a prediction about interest rates in 3 months if 
the data for that variable itself is not available before 3 months have expired. 
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Table 7: Variable Notation and Description 
 
Series 
 
Description 
 
Info. Lag 
(Months) 
FFTR Federal Funds Target Rate 0 
BILL 90-day T-bill 0 
SPREAD 10 year-90-day Treasury Spread 0 
SP500 S&P 500 0 
M0 Monetary Base 1 
M1 M1 1 
M2 M2 1 
GDPGP GDP Gap 3 
CPI Consumer Price Index 3 
INFEXP Michigan Index of Expected Inflation 0 
GND Gross National Debt 0 
UNEMP National Unemployment Rate 0 
HOUST Housing Starts 1 
CONCO Consumer Sentiment/Confidence 0 
GOLD Prevailing Gold Price Per Troy Ounce 0 
 
Basic Model and Criteria for Evaluating Results 
When sorting through such a broad selection of financial variables, one 
must be careful not to include so many variables that the in-sample model is 
over-fit. Thus a variable selection model must be used. 
As mentioned earlier, it is imperative to keep predictive models simple 
and composed of as few variables as possible, thus an exhaustive variable 
selection method is employed in this experiment. The first phase of the 
experiment will require running bivariate OLS regressions. The T-bill return 
will be regressed on each individual independent variable. This will give us an 
idea of which variables could possibly make up the model. After that, remarks 
will be made and the variables with significant test statistics will be used for 
further analysis. The second phase will involve regressing T-bill returns on the 
variables chosen in phase 1 in addition to each of the variables in Table 7. After 
the second phase, R-Squared and test statistics will be interpreted to assess 
the predictive power of each model. Significant lags of variables will be 
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considered for inclusion. Beyond that, variables with the most impact on R-
Squared will be sought for inclusion.4  
 
CHAPTER 4 - Results 
In-Sample Results 
Results from Tables 8 and 9 reveal a number of expected as well as 
unexpected findings. First, the difference in dependant variables used in the 
two separate tables appears to yield little difference in results, this is to be 
expected considering the cointegration evidence. As per both tables, the results 
match the intuition that follows from the theoretical model proposed by Taylor 
(1993). In other words, both the output gap and the CPI series show 
significance at high levels with lags greater than 3 quarters.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4
 The Newey-West technique for correction of serial correlation and heteroskedasticity was deployed (Newey and 
West 1987). However, OLS results showed little difference in statistics. Thus OLS results are reported, as OLS is 
more precise in the absence of serial correlation and heteroskedasticity. 
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Table 8: Measures of Fit and t-statistics for In-sample Bivariate Models: BILL as 
Dependant Variable 
  
𝑩𝑰𝑳𝑳𝒕+𝒌 = 𝜶 + 𝜷𝟏𝝋𝒕 
 
𝒌 = 𝑸𝒖𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝑨𝒉𝒆𝒂𝒅 
𝝋𝒕 𝑽𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆𝒔 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
         
Treasury Spread 
   𝑅2 
   t-stat 
 
0.02 
-1.42 
 
0.00 
-0.81 
 
0.00 
-0.25 
 
0.00 
0.27 
 
0.00 
0.56 
 
0.01 
0.91 
 
0.02 
1.32 
 
0.02 
1.31 
S&P 500 
   𝑅2 
   t-stat  
 
0.04 
1.77 
 
0.04 
1.96 
 
0.06 
2.38 
 
0.05 
2.07 
 
0.05 
2.13 
 
0.02 
1.54 
 
0.02 
1.28 
 
0.01 
1.08 
M0 
   𝑅2 
   t-stat 
 
0.00 
-0.50 
 
0.00 
-0.43 
 
0.00 
0.13 
 
0.00 
0.41 
 
0.00 
0.42 
 
0.00 
0.37 
 
0.00 
0.65 
 
0.00 
0.43 
M1 
   𝑅2 
   t-stat 
 
0.00 
-0.44 
 
0.00 
-0.28 
 
0.00 
0.14 
 
0.00 
0.64 
 
0.01 
0.93 
 
0.02 
1.21 
 
0.03 
1.57 
 
0.05 
2.13 
M2 
   𝑅2 
    t-stat 
 
0.04 
1.74 
 
0.05 
2.03 
 
0.05 
2.05 
 
0.06 
2.22 
 
0.07 
2.52 
 
0.07 
2.52 
 
0.06 
2.36 
 
0.05 
2.08 
Output Gap 
   𝑅2 
   t-stat 
 
0.02 
-1.16 
 
0.03 
-1.61 
 
0.06 
-2.31 
 
0.10 
-3.08 
 
0.15 
-3.90 
 
0.21 
-4.63 
 
0.25 
-5.26 
 
0.28 
-5.68 
CPI 
   𝑅2 
   t-stat 
 
0.19 
4.32 
 
0.17 
4.09 
 
0.15 
3.82 
 
0.14 
3.63 
 
0.10 
3.10 
 
0.08 
2.68 
 
0.10 
2.99 
 
0.12 
3.27 
Inflation Expectations 
   𝑅2 
   t-stat 
 
0.00 
0.42 
 
0.00 
0.24 
 
0.00 
0.45 
 
0.00 
0.49 
 
0.00 
0.72 
 
0.01 
1.09 
 
0.00 
0.92 
 
0.00 
-0.65 
National Debt 
   𝑅2 
   t-stat  
 
0.17 
4.06 
 
0.17 
4.13 
 
0.19 
4.36 
 
0.19 
4.33 
 
0.21 
4.73 
 
0.21 
4.70 
 
0.20 
4.46 
 
0.18 
4.28 
Unemployment 
   𝑅2 
   t-stat 
 
0.09 
2.83 
 
0.12 
3.36 
 
0.16 
4.00 
 
0.21 
4.66 
 
0.32 
4.66 
 
0.30 
5.96 
 
0.36 
6.58 
 
0.38 
7.14 
Housing Starts 
   𝑅2 
   t-stat 
 
0.00 
-0.64 
 
0.00 
0.25 
 
0.00 
0.62 
 
0.01 
0.83 
 
0.01 
0.99 
 
0.01 
0.85 
 
0.01 
0.71 
 
0.01 
0.71 
Consumer Confidence 
   𝑅2 
   t-stat 
 
0.01 
0.64 
 
0.01 
1.06 
 
0.05 
1.97 
 
0.04 
1.90 
 
0.04 
1.75 
 
0.02 
1.42 
 
1.63 
1.28 
 
0.04 
1.78 
Gold Price 
   𝑅2 
   t-stat 
 
0.08 
-2.72 
 
0.03 
-1.62 
 
0.03 
-1.66 
 
0.02 
-1.25 
 
0.01 
-0.91 
 
0.01 
-0.95 
 
0.00 
0.14 
 
0.00 
-0.50 
 
Notes: T-bill returns are regressed on each independent variable separately for up to 8 quarters ahead.  
Observations: 84, Sample period: 1983:1-2003:4, Frequency: Quarterly 
Results for the model:  𝑩𝑰𝑳𝑳𝒕+𝒌 = 𝜶 + 𝑩𝑰𝑳𝑳𝒕 + 𝜷𝟏𝝋𝒕  are reported in Table 14.  
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Table 9: Measures of Fit and t-statistics for In-sample Bivariate Models: FFER as 
Dependant Variable 
 
𝑭𝑭𝑬𝑹𝒕+𝒌 = 𝜶 + 𝜷𝟏𝝋𝒕 
 
𝒌 = 𝑸𝒖𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝑨𝒉𝒆𝒂𝒅 
𝝋𝒕 𝑽𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆𝒔 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
         
Treasury Spread 
   𝑅2 
   t-stat 
 
0.03 
-1.63 
 
0.00 
-0.88 
 
0.00 
-0.28 
 
0.00 
0.33 
 
0.01 
0.74 
 
0.01 
1.07 
 
0.03 
1.53 
 
0.02 
1.43 
S&P 500 
   𝑅2 
   t-stat  
 
0.04 
1.75 
 
0.05 
2.02 
 
0.06 
2.39 
 
0.05 
2.17 
 
0.06 
2.37 
 
0.03 
1.63 
 
0.02 
1.34 
 
0.01 
0.95 
M0 
   𝑅2 
   t-stat 
 
0.00 
-0.55 
 
0.00 
-0.42 
 
0.00 
0.13 
 
0.00 
0.30 
 
0.00 
0.43 
 
0.00 
0.35 
 
0.02 
1.34 
 
0.01 
0.66 
M1 
   𝑅2 
   t-stat 
 
0.00 
-0.44 
 
0.00 
-0.19 
 
0.00 
0.24 
 
0.00 
0.73 
 
0.01 
1.06 
 
0.02 
1.29 
 
0.03 
1.72 
 
0.06 
2.19 
M2 
   𝑅2 
    t-stat 
 
0.04 
1.86 
 
0.05 
2.07 
 
0.06 
2.23 
 
0.06 
2.34 
 
0.08 
2.72 
 
0.09 
2.81 
 
0.06 
2.32 
 
0.06 
2.30 
Output Gap 
   𝑅2 
   t-stat 
 
0.01 
-0.81 
 
0.02 
-1.29 
 
0.05 
-1.98 
 
0.09 
-2.78 
 
0.13 
-3.57 
 
0.18 
-4.26 
 
0.23 
-4.89 
 
0.26 
-5.32 
CPI 
   𝑅2 
   t-stat 
 
0.19 
4.37 
 
0.17 
4.09 
 
0.13 
3.57 
 
0.12 
3.38 
 
0.09 
2.79 
 
0.07 
2.42 
 
0.09 
2.80 
 
0.10 
3.07 
Inflation Expectations 
   𝑅2 
   t-stat 
 
0.00 
0.28 
 
0.00 
0.21 
 
0.00 
0.44 
 
0.00 
0.47 
 
0.00 
0.62 
 
0.02 
1.15 
 
0.00 
0.82 
 
0.01 
-0.69 
National Debt 
   𝑅2 
   t-stat  
 
0.15 
3.85 
 
0.17 
4.03 
 
0.18 
4.19 
 
0.19 
4.40 
 
0.21 
4.67 
 
0.21 
4.68 
 
0.19 
4.45 
 
0.18 
4.27 
Unemployment 
   𝑅2 
   t-stat 
 
0.07 
2.53 
 
0.10 
3.09 
 
0.15 
3.74 
 
0.19 
4.42 
 
0.24 
5.11 
 
0.29 
5.72 
 
0.33 
6.36 
 
0.37 
6.92 
Housing Starts 
   𝑅2 
   t-stat 
 
0.00 
-0.74 
 
0.00 
0.16 
 
0.00 
0.49 
 
0.01 
0.81 
 
0.01 
0.81 
 
0.01 
0.94 
 
0.01 
0.65 
 
0.01 
0.66 
Consumer Confidence 
   𝑅2 
   t-stat 
 
0.00 
0.52 
 
0.02 
1.13 
 
0.04 
1.78 
 
0.05 
1.97 
 
0.04 
`1.84 
 
0.02 
1.27 
 
0.02 
1.37 
 
0.03 
1.52 
Gold Price 
   𝑅2 
   t-stat 
 
0.07 
-2.39 
 
0.03 
-1.61 
 
0.03 
-1.54 
 
0.02 
-1.14 
 
0.01 
-0.82 
 
0.00 
-0.52 
 
0.00 
0.09 
 
0.00 
-0.38 
 
Notes: Federal fund effective rates are regressed on each independent variable separately for up to 8 quarters ahead. 
Observations: 84, Sample period: 1983:1-2003:4, Frequency: Quarterly 
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Table 10 displays statistics found by running the Taylor Rule in addition 
to each separate variable found to perform well in the above regressions. The 
results show that the S&P 500, M2, National Debt and Unemployment all 
improve the standard Taylor equation significantly from 1 to 6 steps ahead. 
Principle Component Analysis 
 It is possible that the analysis in Table 10 runs into the problem of using 
too many degrees-of-freedom. One approach to this problem is simple and has 
been used heavily in recent macroeconomic literature including Stock and 
Watson (2002), Bernanke and Boivin (2003) and Bernanke, and Boivin and 
Eliasz (2004). Dynamic-factor models are derived using principle component 
analysis where the observed endogenous variables are linear functions of 
exogenous covariates and unobserved factors. The use of such models allows 
for ease of use insofar as the number of variables is significantly decreased by 
grouping according to index. Also, the degrees-of-freedom problem will be 
solved if a single factor effectively summarizes all of the variables employed in 
the principle component analysis. 
  According to Jolliffe (28), “Principle component analysis (PCA) is 
mathematically defined as an orthogonal linear transformation that transforms 
the data to a new coordinate system such that the greatest variance by any 
projection of the data comes to lie on the first coordinate (called the first 
principal component), the second greatest variance on the second coordinate, 
and so on.” Less formally, we are trying to capture the similarity in movements 
among several series in a single series. In this thesis, the principle component 
is constructed using the following method. First, we should consider the matrix 
W. 
  
W =  
𝐶𝑃𝐼1 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐺𝑃1 𝑆𝑃5001 𝑀21 𝐺𝑁𝐷1 𝑈𝑁𝐸𝑀𝑃1
𝐶𝑃𝐼2 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐺𝑃2 𝑆𝑃5002 𝑀22 𝐺𝑁𝐷2 𝑈𝑁𝐸𝑀𝑃2
⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮
𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑇 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐺𝑃𝑇 𝑆𝑃500𝑇 𝑀2𝑇 𝐺𝑁𝐷𝑇 𝑈𝑁𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑇
  
 
(10) 
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Where CPI, GDPGP, etc. are the explanatory variables we wish to use. If we 
believe these series are correlated, as is the case with many macroeconomic 
variables, we may wish to reduce the dimensions of the matrix W in order to 
reduce the degrees of freedom used by running a regression. 
 The process of making this dimensional reduction requires us to find 
matrices U and V such that W=UV. This can be described by the following 
equation. 
 
W =  
𝐶𝑃𝐼1 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐺𝑃1 𝑆𝑃5001 𝑀21 𝐺𝑁𝐷1 𝑈𝑁𝐸𝑀𝑃1
𝐶𝑃𝐼2 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐺𝑃2 𝑆𝑃5002 𝑀22 𝐺𝑁𝐷2 𝑈𝑁𝐸𝑀𝑃2
⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮
𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑇 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐺𝑃𝑇 𝑆𝑃500𝑇 𝑀2𝑇 𝐺𝑁𝐷𝑇 𝑈𝑁𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑇
  
=   
𝑢11 ⋯ 𝑢61
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝑢1𝑇 ⋯ 𝑢6𝑇
   
𝑣11 ⋯ 𝑣61
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝑣61 ⋯ 𝑣66
  
=  𝑈1 ⋯ 𝑈6   𝑉1 ⋯ 𝑉6  
 
 
 
(11) 
 
U is a matrix constructed as described below. 𝑉1 − 𝑉6 are the eigenvectors 
of cov(W) arranged so that 𝑉1 has the largest associated eigenvalue. 𝑈1 − 𝑈6 are 
the actual principle components. The first principle component is the vector of 
interest in our analysis since it explains most of the co-movement among the 
variables of interest. The reason this is true is because 𝑈1 is a function of 𝑉1, 
and 𝑉1 is the eignvector with the largest eigenvalue. In practice, 𝑈2 through 𝑈6 
may explain very little of the variance among the variables. We will only use 𝑈1 
in our analysis. 
The principle component analysis in this thesis takes the following form: 
First, the first principle component is calculated for the variables (CPI, GDPGP, 
SP500, M2, GND, UNEMP). Second, regressions are run using BILL as the 
dependant variable and the component as the independent variable. Results 
from these regressions will be compared to results obtained by similar 
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regressions using a component composed of 16 (ten more than the original) 
randomly chosen macroeconomic variables. Results show that the 6-variable 
principle component series clearly outperforms the test series composed of 16 
variables. This suggests the variables chosen as “good fits” outperform the 
randomly chosen variables composing the test series. See figures 4 and 5 
(appendix). 
 
Table 10: Measures of Fit and t-statistics For In-sample models: variables with CPI and 
GDP Gap 
 
𝑩𝑰𝑳𝑳𝒕+𝒌 = 𝜶 + 𝜷𝟏𝝅𝒕 + 𝜷𝟐𝒚𝒕 + 𝜷𝟑𝝋𝒕 
 
𝒌 = 𝑸𝒖𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝑨𝒉𝒆𝒂𝒅 
𝝋𝒕 𝑽𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆𝒔  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
          
S&P 500 
   𝑹𝟐 
   t-stat 𝜋𝑡  
   t-stat 𝑦𝑡  
   t-stat 𝜑1𝑡  
  
0.27 
4.97 
-2.27 
2.58 
 
0.26 
4.60 
-1.23 
2.67 
 
0.28 
4.33 
-1.81 
3.08 
 
0.29 
4.03 
-2.82 
2.71 
 
0.30 
3.38 
-3.60 
2.69 
 
0.30 
2.89 
-4.28 
2.22 
 
0.34 
3.06 
-4.86 
2.01 
 
0.38 
3.40 
-5.33 
1.93 
M2 
   𝑹𝟐 
   t-stat 𝜋𝑡  
   t-stat 𝑦𝑡  
   t-stat 𝜑1𝑡  
  
0.32 
5.71 
-1.30 
3.64 
 
0.31 
5.24 
-1.12 
3.59 
 
0.29 
4.64 
-1.58 
3.18 
 
0.31 
4.46 
-2.36 
3.16 
 
0.31 
3.67 
-3.08 
2.95 
 
0.32 
2.93 
-3.82 
2.61 
 
0.34 
2.91 
-4.44 
2.05 
 
0.37 
3.15 
-4.96 
1.64 
National Debt 
   𝑹𝟐 
   t-stat 𝜋𝑡  
   t-stat 𝑦𝑡  
   t-stat 𝜑1𝑡  
  
0.30 
3.69 
0.61 
3.28 
 
0.28 
3.30 
0.58 
3.08 
 
0.28 
3.11 
-0.12 
2.98 
 
0.27 
2.97 
-1.12 
2.38 
 
0.29 
2.33 
-1.75 
2.42 
 
0.30 
1.93 
-2.47 
2.14 
 
0.34 
2.38 
-3.21 
1.79 
 
0.37 
2.73 
-3.84 
1.30 
Unemployment 
   𝑹𝟐 
   t-stat 𝜋𝑡  
   t-stat 𝑦𝑡  
   t-stat 𝜑1𝑡  
  
0.31 
3.10 
3.64 
4.63 
 
0.34 
2.92 
3.95 
5.10 
 
0.34 
2.60 
3.79 
5.07 
 
0.35 
2.75 
3.00 
4.55 
 
0.35 
2.33 
2.33 
4.12 
 
0.36 
1.91 
1.74 
3.74 
 
0.38 
1.59 
1.45 
3.66 
 
0.44 
2.20 
1.34 
3.76 
 
Notes: T-bill returns are regressed on inflation, the output gap, and each 𝜑 variable for up to 8 quarters ahead. 
Observations: 84, Sample period: 1983:1-2003:4, Frequency: Quarterly 
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Table 11: Measures of Fit and t-statistics for In-sample Bivariate Models: BILL as 
Dependant Variable; Principle Components as Independent (6 variables) 
 
𝑩𝑰𝑳𝑳𝒕+𝒌 = 𝜶 + 𝜷𝟏𝝋𝒕 
 
𝒌 = 𝑸𝒖𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝑨𝒉𝒆𝒂𝒅 
𝝋𝒕 𝑽𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
         
Component 𝑈1 
   𝑅2 
   t-stat 
 
0.10 
3.05 
 
0.13 
3.52 
 
0.19 
4.34 
 
0.23 
4.90 
 
0.29 
5.72 
 
0.32 
6.24 
 
0.35 
6.61 
 
0.37 
6.92 
 
Notes: T-bill returns (up to 8 quarters ahead) are regressed on a principle component found using Stata.  
Observations: 84, Sample period: 1983:1-2003:4, Frequency: Quarterly 
Results for the model:  𝑩𝑰𝑳𝑳𝒕+𝒌 = 𝜶 + 𝑩𝑰𝑳𝑳𝒕 + 𝜷𝟏𝝋𝒕  are reported in Table 15. 
 
 
Table 12: Measures of Fit and t-statistics for In-sample Bivariate Models: BILL as 
Dependant Variable; Principle Components as Independent (14 variables) 
 
𝑩𝑰𝑳𝑳𝒕+𝒌 = 𝜶 + 𝜷𝟏𝝋𝒕 
 
𝒌 = 𝑸𝒖𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝑨𝒉𝒆𝒂𝒅 
𝝋𝒕 𝑽𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
         
Component 𝑈1 
   𝑅2 
   t-stat 
 
0.02 
1.32 
 
0.04 
1.88 
 
0.08 
2.63 
 
0.10 
2.95 
 
0.16 
3.89 
 
0.18 
4.20 
 
0.21 
4.70 
 
0.21 
4.67 
 
Note: T-bill returns (up to 8 quarters ahead) are regressed on a principle component found using Stata.  
Observations: 84, Sample period: 1983:1-2003:4, Frequency: Quarterly 
 
Out-of-Sample Results 
Why do out-of-sample model evaluation? Most forecasters agree that in-
sample goodness-of-fit is just not enough evidence to conclude a variable is a 
good predictor. The performance of a model on data outside that used in its 
construction remains the touchstone for its utility in all applications (Fildes 
and Makridakis p. 293, 1995). When one makes a forecast, it is always done in 
an out-of-sample fashion. It is natural to assess a model based on how it would 
have done in the past. 
Difference among in-sample and post-sample conclusions may arise for a 
number of reasons. First, overfitting is a problem faced by those using 
econometrics to explain relationships. Beyond that, structural changes often 
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cause a model that was once effective to perform poorly when the underlying 
parameters change. An out-of-sample test will easily assess how much a model 
is affected by parameter instability. 
The out-of-sample results in this thesis are constructed in the following 
manner. First, an autoregressive model is run for the fit-period 1980:1-2003:4. 
The optimal lag length is determined by AIC. As discussed in Liu and Enders 
(2003), the AIC is designed to combat the problem of overfitting by adding a 
penalty term for each estimated parameter. Considering out-of-sample testing 
is sensitive to overfitting, AIC is one method for model selection of our 
forecasting models. 
 
𝐵𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽2𝐵𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑡−1 + ⋯ + 𝛽ℎ𝐵𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑡−ℎ + 𝜀𝑡  (12) 
 
where 𝜑𝑡 denotes the variable being tested for predictive capacity and h is the 
optimal lag length chosen by the Akaike information criterion method proposed 
by Akaike (1974). 
Once the fit-period model is estimated, it is used to make out-of-sample 
predictions across the forecast horizon 2004:1-2008:4. The Mean Squared 
Error (MSE) between actual out-of-sample values and the predictions generated 
by the autoregressive model will be computed as a benchmark for determining 
predictive power in the next step of the process. Next, bivariate VARs are run 
using the same fit-period in order to make forecasts for the same forecast 
horizon as the AR model.  
 
𝐵𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽2𝐵𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑡−1 + ⋯ + 𝛽ℎ𝐵𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑡−ℎ + 𝜗1𝜑𝑡−1 + ⋯ + 𝜗ℎ𝜑𝑡−ℎ
+ 𝜀𝑡  
 
(13) 
In Table 13, the MSE of the autoregressive model is divided by the MSE 
of the respective vector autoregressive model. A number exceeding 1 indicates 
the variable is useful for predicting T-bill returns. 
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After analyzing the results of Table 6, we see evidence both affirming and 
negating the evidence gathered from earlier tables. As expected, the output gap 
and unemployment rate come out on top, easily outperforming the univariate 
AR model. The output gap increased the predictive power of the model across 
most forecast periods tested; where unemployment was effective after five steps 
ahead. The in-sample regressions yield very similar results. 
A surprising performance was that of the S&P 500. At this point it is 
somewhat clear that the stock market holds predictive power about future 
interest rates from 4-8 months out. The economic intuition most likely goes as 
follows: First, we know from Table 4 that the S&P 500 has a positive effect on 
interest rates. Consider this narrative as an explanation: Given that declines in 
the stock market often closely follow sharp drops in output (Note: declines in 
output lead to the Federal Reserve lowering rates via the Taylor Rule), one 
could assume that interest rates should go down following a drop in the stock 
market as well. 
Although a phenomenal performer in the in-sample regressions, 
including the CPI led to worse forecasts than with the AR model. One possible 
explanation for the underperformance of CPI could be due to the volatility of 
the series. Predictions using models constructed from volatile data often yield 
large errors. 
Robustness 
 Given that the CPI shows no out-of-sample forecasting power in our 
analysis, we will also consider a core PCE deflator series. The purpose of this is 
to capture a less volatile measure of inflation. Additionally, on February 17, 
2000 the Federal Reserve announced they would be abandoning the CPI index 
in favor of a chain-type PCE deflator (Monetary Policy Report, 2000). The 
advantage of the core PCE index is that it does not include food and energy 
prices (these series tend to be seasonal and very volatile). For this reason the 
series is more robust to price shocks that cause influential outliers in our 
forecasts. 
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 The results in Table 13 indicate the core PCE deflator is extremely 
predictive of T-bill rates and yields a small MSE for the period forecasted. The 
MSE for this variable is almost suspiciously small. To double-check this result, 
we also used a rolling window method to find the MSE of forecasts using many 
different fit periods. Results are similar to those found in Table 13 for both CPI 
and the core PCE deflator. Rolling windows is a process by which an MSE is 
computed over every possible forecast horizon. This process gives a researcher 
the ability to further check the stability of the forecast errors over time. 
 As for the other variables, we test their robustness by using a rolling 
windows technique also. However, we found little difference between forecast 
errors from periods other than our chosen out-of-sample period (2004:1 to 
2008:4). As for the variables that did differ somewhat, we elected to ignore the 
differences in favor of taking data from the most up-to-date horizon. 
 We find that the AR model performs better than the VAR model for the 
first 2 steps ahead in the case of almost every variable. We can say this is so 
for a couple reasons. First, the Federal Reserve is forward-looking according to 
the findings of Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000). If economic conditions more 
than 2 quarters ago are the main determinants of inflation and output in the 
near future, it makes sense the Federal Reserve actually reacts to changes in 
economic conditions from more than 2 quarters prior. As an illustration, 
consider a large increase in output in time t. Under the assumption that prices 
are sticky and take 1 year to adjust, the inflation caused by the increase in 
output will not be realized until t+4. The Federal Reserve will predict this 
inflation in t+3 and change the federal funds rate as soon as possible. Thus we 
see the poor performance at short horizons. Second, and arguably the most 
important for us to consider, AR forecasts are well suited for predicting short 
horizons because they capture the “momentum” of the series at hand. However, 
after a few periods, this momentum often leads forecasts in an incorrect 
direction.  
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Table 13: Out-of-sample Forecast MSE (AR) / MSE (VAR) 
 
VAR: 𝑩𝑰𝑳𝑳𝒕+𝒌 = 𝜶 + 𝜷𝟐𝑩𝑰𝑳𝑳𝒕−𝟏 + ⋯ + 𝜷𝒉𝑩𝑰𝑳𝑳𝒕−𝒉 + 𝝑𝟐𝝋𝒕−𝟏 + ⋯ + 𝝑𝒉𝝋𝒕−𝒉 + 𝜺𝒕 
AR: 𝑩𝑰𝑳𝑳𝒕 = 𝜶 + 𝜷𝟐𝑩𝑰𝑳𝑳𝒕−𝟏 + ⋯ + 𝜷𝒉𝑩𝑰𝑳𝑳𝒕−𝒉 + 𝜺𝒕 
𝒌 = 𝑸𝒖𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝑨𝒉𝒆𝒂𝒅 
𝝋𝒕 𝑽𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆𝒔 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
         
 
S&P 500 
 
0.228 
 
0.510 
 
0.806 
 
1.047 
 
1.209 
 
1.280 
 
1.384 
 
1.365 
 
M2 
 
0.153 
 
0.343 
 
0.540 
 
0.737 
 
0.796 
 
0.817 
 
0.877 
 
0.864 
 
Output Gap 
 
0.383 
 
0.580 
 
0.733 
 
0.966 
 
1.178 
 
1.298 
 
1.380 
 
1.385 
 
CPI 
 
 
0.078 
 
 
0.189 
 
 
0.339 
 
 
0.495 
 
 
0.614 
 
 
0.688 
 
 
0.778 
 
 
0.842 
 
Core PCE deflator 1.376
5
 1.581 1.364 2.175 1.414 1.343 1.346 1.398 
 
National Debt 
 
 
0.185 
 
0.436 
 
0.733 
 
0.994 
 
1.057 
 
0.985 
 
0.938 
 
0.916 
Unemployment 0.099 0.258 0.461 0.708 0.907 1.033 1.184 1.272 
 
Component 𝑈1 0.087 0.223 0.431 0.690 0.891 0.987 1.071 1.075 
 
Notes: AR denotes Autoregression; VAR denotes Vector Autoregression 
Observations: 115, Sample period: 1980:1-2008:4, Frequency: Quarterly 
This table reports the mean squared error found in the AR forecasts divided by the mean squared error found in the 
VAR forecasts. A value exceeding 1 tells us the additional variable is useful for predicting T-bill rate movement. 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 5 - Conclusions 
This thesis developed methods for identifying leading indicators for T-bill 
interest rate movements. From the extensive scope of variables tested, six 
variables exhibit performance worth noting: S&P 500, M2, output gap, CPI, 
national debt and unemployment.  
These variables were supported first by simple OLS regressions.  
Then, analysis of out-of-sample forecasting errors provided additional evidence 
of predictive ability. A noteworthy feature of these six variables is that, if 
                                                 
5
 The errors used for the calculation of this figure are plotted together in Figure 6 (appendix). The AR is 
outperformed by the VAR according to MSE. 
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reduced to a single dynamic factor, the factor is statistically significant, 
especially when contrasted with models containing more variables. 
A few of these variables have been identified in the literature previously. 
The output gap and inflation rate are the two most popular. We found the core 
PCE deflator more useful than the CPI at forecasting interest rates however. 
This is likely the series the Federal Reserve pays most attention to. 
Overall, this thesis provides a good deal of evidence suggesting the 
unemployment rate and stock market performance are two series worth 
consideration in addition to the output gap and inflation. These four variables 
not only showed a good in-sample fit, but also improved the accuracy of our 
out-of-sample forecasts considerably. 
 
 The author is indebted to Bob Arnold of the Congressional Budget Office 
for data suggestions, Richard Anderson of the Kansas City Federal 
Reserve for his unique input, Vladimir Bejan for ongoing discussion on 
money and banking topics, Dr. Hamilton Fout for help crafting a topic and 
serving as a committee member, Dr. Steven Cassou for serving as a 
committee member and advisement prior to defense and most of all to Dr. 
Lance Bachmeier for his patience, suggestions, and help on this thesis in 
addition to his invaluable academic advisement. 
 
 
  
 33 
References 
Akaike, H., 1974, A new look at the statistical model identification, IEEE 
 Transaction on Automatic Control AC-19, 716-723. 
 
Banerjee, Anindya & Marcellino, Massimiliano, 2006. “Are there any reliable 
 leading indicators for US inflation and GDP growth?,” International 
 Journal of Forecasting, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 137-151.  
 
Barro, Robert J., and David B. Gordon (1983). “A Positive Theory of Monetary 
 Policy in a Natural-Rate Model,” Journal of Political Economy 91, 589- 
 610. 
 
Bernanke, Ben. “Monetary Policy and the Housing Bubble.” 
 FederalReserve.gov. January 3, 2010. Federal Reserve, Web.
 <http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20100103
 a.pdf>. 
 
Bernanke, Ben S., and Alan S. Blinder. 1992. “The Federal Funds Rate and the 
  Channels of Monetary Transmission.” American Economic Review 82, pp. 
 901–921. 
 
Box, George F. P., and Gwilym M. Jenkins, Time Series Analysis, Forecasting 
 and Control (San Francisco: Holden Day, 1976). page 409. 
 
Clarida, Richard, Jordi Gali, and Mark Gertler. “Monetary Policy Rules and 
 Macroeconomic Stability: Evidence and Some Theory.” Quarterly 
 Journal of Economics. 115.1 (2000):  147-180. Print.  
 
Cook, Timothy, Thomas Hahn. “The Effect of Changers in the Federal Funds 
 Rate Target of Market Interest Rates in the 1970s.” Richmondfed.org. 
 1988. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond. 8 Sep 2009 
 <http://www.richmondfed.org/publications/research/working_papers/1
 988/pdf/wp88-4.pdf>. 
 
Diebold, Francis. "The Past, Present, and Future of Macroeconomic 
 Forecasting." Journal of Economic Perspectives. 12.2 (1998): Print. 
 
Diebold, Francis, and Glenn Rudebusch. “Scoring the Leading Indicators.”
 Journal of Business 62.3 (1989): 396-391. Web. 26 Mar 2010. 
 
Estrella, Arturo, Frederic Mishkin. “Predicting U.S. Recessions: Financial 
 Variables as Leading Indicators.” The Review of Economics and Statistics 
 80(1998): 45-61.  
 
 34 
Fildes, R., and Makridakis, S. (1995). The impact of empirical accuracy studies 
 on time series analysis and forecasting. International Statistical Review 
 63, 289-308.  
 
Jolliffe, I.T. Principle Component Analysis. 2nd. New York, NY: Springer New 
 York Inc., 2002. 28. Print. 
 
Kaminsky, Graciela, Saul Lizondo, and Carmen Reinhart. “Leading Indicators 
 of Currency Crises.” IMF Staff Papers. (1998): Print. 
 
Khoury, Salwa S. (1990). “The Federal Reserve Reaction Function: A 
 Specification Search.” In The Political Economy of American Monetary 
 Policy, ed. Thomas Mayer. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University 
 Press, pp. 27–41. 
 
King, Mervyn (1996), “How should Central Banks Reduce Inflation? Conceptual 
 Issues,” in Achieving Price Stability, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, 
 Kansas City, MO: 53-91 
 
Koopmans, Tjalling (1947). “Measurement without Theory,” The Review of 
 Economics and Statistics, 161-172. 
 
Liu, Y., and W. Enders, 2003. Out-of-Sample Forecasts and Non-linear Model 
 Selection With an Example of the Term-Structure of Interest Rates. 
 Southern Economics Journal 
 
Lucas, Robert (1976), “Econometric Policy Evaluation: A Critique”, in Brunner, 
K.; Meltzer, A., The Phillips Curve and Labor Markets, Carnegie-Rochester 
Conference Series on Public Policy, 1, New York: American Elsevier, 
pp. 19–46 
 
Meulendyke, Anne-Marie. U.S. Monetary Policy and Financial Markets. Federal 
 Reserve Bank of New York, 1998. 
 
Mishkin, Frederic. Monetary Policy Strategy. Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, 2007. 37. Print. 
 
Mitchell, W.C., and A.F. Burns. 1938. Statistical Indicators of Cyclical Revivals. 
 National Bureau Of Economic Research, New York. 
 
“Monetary Policy Report submitted to the Congress on February 17, 2000, 
 pursuant to the Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act of 1978.” 
 Web site of the Federal Reserve. N.p., Febuary 17, 2000. Web. 12 Apr 
 2010. 
 
 35 
Newey, Whitney, and Kenneth West, “A Simple Positive Semi-Definite 
 Heteroskedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent Covariance Matrix,” 
 Econometrica 55 (May 1987), 703-708. 
 
“Open Market Operations.” FederalReserve.gov. Federal Reserve Board, 
 26/01/2010. Web. 16 Mar 2010. 
 <http://www.federalreserve.gov/fomc/fundsrate.htm>. 
 
Orphanides, Athanasios. “Policy Rules Based on Real-Time Data.” American 
 Economic Review.  91.4 (2001): 964-985. Print. 
 
Pratt, Shannon, Robert Reilly, and Robert Schweihs. Valuing a business: the 
analysis and appraisal of closely held companies. McGraw-Hill, 2000. 
161. Print. 
 
Rose, Peter S. 1994. Money and Capital Markets, Irwin, Boston. See Chapter 
14, page 369. 
 
Rudebusch, G.D., 2001. Term structure evidence on interest rate smoothing 
  and monetary policy inertia. Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, 
 Mimeo. 
 
Rudebusch G. Svensson L. 1998. Policy Rules for Inflation Targeting. In Taylor  
J. (ed), Monetary Policy Rules, University of Chicago Press. 
 
Said, S.E. and Dickey, D.A., 1984, “Testing for Unit Roots in ARMA Models of 
 Unknown Order,” Biometrika, Vol. 71, pp. 599-607. 
 
Sarno, l., and D. Thorton. “The dynamic relationship between the federal funds  
rate and the Treasury bill rate: An empirical investigation.” Journal of 
Banking and Finance. 27.6 (2003): 1079-1110. Print. 
 
Johansen, Søren, “Cointegration and Hypothesis Testing of Cointegration 
 Vectors in Gaussian Vector Autoregressive Models.” Econometrica, 
 Vol.59, No.6 (Nov 1991) 1551–1580. 
 
Stock, James H., and Mark W. Watson (2002). “Forecasting Using Principle 
 Components From a Large Number of Predictors.” Journal of the 
 American Statistical Association. 97.460: 1167-1179. Print. 
 
Stock, James H., and Mark W. Watson (1988). “Testing for Common Trends.” 
 Journal of the American Statistical Association 83, 1097–1107. 
 
 
 36 
Stock, James H., and Mark W. Watson (1999a). “Business Cycles Fluctuations 
 in US Macroeconomic Time Series.” In Handbook of Macroeconomics, Vol. 
 1A, edited by John B. Taylor, and Michael Woodford, pp. 1–64. North 
 Holland: Elsevier Science. 
 
Svensson L.E.O. (1997), “Inflation targeting: implementing and monitoring 
inflation targets,” European Economic Review, 41(6), pp 1111-1146 
 
Taylor, John. “Expectations, Open Market Operations, and Changes in the 
 Federal Funds Rate.” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review 83.4 
 (2001): 37-48. Web. 11 Jan 2010. 
 
Taylor, John B. 1993. “Discretion Versus Policy Rules in Practice.” Carnegie-
 Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy 39, pp. 195–214. 
 
Thomas, Lloyd. “Survey Measures of Expected U.S. Inflation.” Journal of 
 Economic Perspectives. 13.4 (1999): 125-144. Print.  
 
Woodford, M., 1999. Optimal monetary policy inertia. The Manchester School 
 67 (Supplement), 1–35 
 
Zarnowitz, Victor and Phillip Braun. 1993. “Twenty-Two Years of the NBER-
 ASSA Quarterly Economic Outlook Surveys: Aspects and Comparisons 
 of Forecasting Performance,” in Business Cycles, Indicators, and 
 Forecasting. Stock, James H. and Mark W. Watson, eds. Chicago, IL: 
 University of Chicago Press.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 37 
Appendix 
Figure 4: Plot of Residuals (6 variables) 𝑩𝑰𝑳𝑳𝒕+𝟓 = 𝑭(𝜶 + 𝜷𝟏𝝋𝒕) 
 
 
Figure 5: Plot of Residuals (14 variables) 𝑩𝑰𝑳𝑳𝒕+𝟓 = 𝑭(𝜶 + 𝜷𝟏𝝋𝒕) 
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Figure 6: Core PCE Deflator VAR vs. AR Errors for 1 Period Lag. 
 
 
Table 14: Measures of Fit and t-statistics: Extra Models 
 
𝑩𝑰𝑳𝑳𝒕+𝒌 = 𝜶 + 𝑩𝑰𝑳𝑳𝒕 + 𝜷𝟏𝝋𝒕 
 
𝒌 = 𝑸𝒖𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝑨𝒉𝒆𝒂𝒅 
𝝋𝒕 𝑽𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆𝒔 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
         
CPI 
   𝑅2 
   t-stat 
 
0.95 
2.47 
 
0.85 
1.18 
 
0.75 
1.10 
 
0.64 
0.64 
 
0.54 
0.47 
 
0.43 
0.35 
 
0.33 
-0.08 
 
0.23 
-0.02 
Output Gap 
   𝑅2 
   t-stat  
 
0.94 
0.44 
 
0.85 
-0.08 
 
0.75 
-0.40 
 
0.64 
-0.94 
 
0.55 
-1.52 
 
0.45 
-1.88 
 
0.36 
-2.07 
 
0.28 
-2.29 
S&P 500 
   𝑅2 
   t-stat 
 
0.94 
1.69 
 
0.86 
1.27 
 
0.76 
1.19 
 
0.65 
1.58 
 
0.55 
1.82 
 
0.45 
2.05 
 
0.37 
2.26 
 
0.29 
2.14 
M2 
   𝑅2 
   t-stat 
 
0.94 
-0.49 
 
0.85 
-0.07 
 
0.75 
-0.43 
 
0.64 
-0.16 
 
0.53 
-0.11 
 
0.43 
-0.08 
 
0.33 
-0.23 
 
0.24 
-0.54 
National Debt 
   𝑅2 
    t-stat 
 
0.94 
-0.96 
 
0.85 
-0.48 
 
0.75 
0.99 
 
0.64 
0.45 
 
0.54 
1.13 
 
0.44 
1.34 
 
0.34 
1.60 
 
0.27 
1.91 
Unemployment 
   𝑅2 
   t-stat 
 
0.94 
0.35 
 
0.86 
0.91 
 
0.76 
1.28 
 
0.65 
1.89 
 
0.57 
2.42 
 
0.48 
2.79 
 
0.40 
3.10 
 
0.34 
3.54 
 
Notes: T-bill returns are regressed on each independent variable separately for up to 8 quarters ahead.  
Observations: 84, Sample period: 1983:1-2003:4, Frequency: Quarterly 
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
VAR Error
AR Error
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Table 15: Measures of Fit and t-statistics: Extra Models 
 
𝑩𝑰𝑳𝑳𝒕+𝒌 = 𝜶 + 𝑩𝑰𝑳𝑳𝒕 + 𝜷𝟏𝝋𝒕 
 
𝒌 = 𝑸𝒖𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝑨𝒉𝒆𝒂𝒅 
𝝋𝒕 𝑽𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
         
Component 𝑈1 
   𝑅2 
   t-stat 
 
0.94 
-0.20 
 
0.85 
0.34 
 
0.75 
0.70 
 
0.65 
1.33 
 
0.56 
1.99 
 
0.46 
2.35 
 
0.38 
2.60 
 
0.31 
2.94 
 
Notes: T-bill returns (up to 8 quarters ahead) are regressed on a principle component found using Stata.  
Observations: 84, Sample period: 1983:1-2003:4, Frequency: Quarterly 
 
 
 
 
